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ON THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
LEAH FARZIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professional sports are built around competition, but the in-
dustry would not exist without collusion.1  Sport does not produce
anything tangible to be imported and exported; yet, it is a substan-
tial business presence.  Because of its economic impact, both the
United States (“US”) and the European Union (“EU”) have had to
reconcile their antitrust laws with sport’s commercial collusion.
This article examines the special treatment sport receives under the
antitrust laws in the US and the EU and the possibility that a de facto
sporting exemption still exists in both jurisdictions.
Professional sports leagues and governing bodies (collectively,
“sports organizations”) are composed of clubs that are separate, yet
economically interdependent, business entities.2  Clubs must coop-
erate on a business level to maintain competitive balance between
them.  By cooperating economically instead of competing with one
another, clubs are apparently violating antitrust laws in both the US
and EU.  In light of this, sports organizations in both jurisdictions
have tried to justify their collusive and monopolistic actions with
various levels of success.
Generally, monopolies are considered negative for economies
and consumers because they misallocate resources.  Both the US
and Europe have developed significant industries in and around
professional sports whose cooperative actions often lead them to
* LL.M. with Distinction from University College, London, 2013; a J.D.,
Northeastern University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Miami University, 2006. Mem-
ber of the bar in Massachusetts.  Currently an Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Alaska.  I would like to thank Stephan Thiel for his critiques and prompt-
ing me to get this article published, Tjasa Tanko for her feedback on an earlier
draft, and Susan Farzin, Chelsea Dorman, T.J. White, and Sophia Apostola for
their encouragement and support during the research and writing process.
1. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg & Justin M. Lovich, Reverse Collusion, 4
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 191 (2013) (discussing language in collective bargaining
agreements that give way to collusion in professional sports).
2. See generally Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient
Joint Ventures: Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the United
Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213 (2006) (arguing that some professional
leagues should be restructured for purposes of regulation and consumer
demand).
(75)
1
Farzin: On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional Sports in the United
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 46 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 46 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 2 31-MAR-15 11:06
76 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 75
behave like monopolies.3  Due to the inefficiencies created by mo-
nopolies in any sector and their effect on consumers, an industry is
rarely excluded from the reach of antitrust laws.
In the US, three of the four major professional sports leagues
do not have any general exemption from federal antitrust laws.4  In
a court challenge, all major leagues except baseball would be sub-
ject to the antitrust laws under the Rule of Reason analysis, but gen-
erally not under the much stricter per se rule.  Because of this,
leagues and clubs are able to counter an accusation of anticompeti-
tive behavior with a justification based on the special circumstances
inherent in maintaining a professional league.
On the European level, the parties most often facing antitrust
scrutiny in the sports industry are not leagues, but governing bod-
ies.  Sports governing bodies (“SGBs”) create rules affecting profes-
sional sports in Europe that could violate European competition
laws if they adversely affect economic competition.  Like US
leagues, SGBs assert that they must be allowed to regulate sports
unencumbered by competition laws because their purpose is not
economic.  Despite this reasoning, professional sports generally are
not exempt from the application of EU competition laws.5  How-
ever, sports are not treated like all other industries; the European
Commission (“Commission”) and the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”) have both been receptive to the argument that sports are
different and must be treated accordingly.6  The legal justification
for this special treatment remains murky.
3. See Claudio G. Catalano, Annotation, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to
Professional Sports, 79 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, § 2 (2003).
4. Professional baseball, football, hockey, and basketball are statutorily ex-
empt from US antitrust laws for the purpose of collectively selling the rights to
television broadcasts of games. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1291-95 (1961).  Broadcasting rights are beyond the scope of this Article.  All
four are also exempt as far as labor relations are concerned, baseball by statute and
the remaining three by the non-statutory labor exemption for collective bargaining
agreements.  For a brief summary of the non-statutory labor exemption in sports,
see Walter T. Champion, Jr., The Second Circuit Takes a Second Look at the Non-statu-
tory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 83, 85-88
(2009).
5. See An Vermeersch, All’s Fair in Sport and Competition? The Application of EC
Competition Rules to Sport, 3 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 238, 253 (2007), available at
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/viewFile/48/70 (discussing impact of
antitrust law on sporting associations in European Union).
6. See Student Comment, European Sports Law is Incapable of Recognising the
‘Specificities of Sport’, LAW TEACHER, http://www.lawteacher.net/sports-law/essays/
european-sports-law.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (noting European Court of Jus-
tice’s ‘specificity of sport as recognized in Dona` v. Mantero (citing Case 13/76,
Dona` v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333)).
2
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The US and the EU have approached the question of how to
apply antitrust laws to sports organizations on a similar trajectory.
In the US, precedents developed sport-by-sport as each operation
was challenged.  In the EU, sports rules were exempt under an ECJ
ruling, but that exemption has since become an affirmative defense
to competition law violations.  The European cases have involved
individual and team sports and have gone beyond professional
leagues.
This Article will examine the relationship between professional
sports and antitrust laws in the US and EU, as well as suggest that
neither jurisdiction has truly eliminated their sports exemptions.
Section II will explain the actions of sports organizations that sub-
ject them to scrutiny under US and EU antitrust laws.  Sections III
and IV will describe the origin and parameters of the antitrust ex-
emption for professional sports in the US and Europe, respectively.
These sections will also demonstrate the difficulty that each jurisdic-
tion has experienced in determining the extent to which sports or-
ganizations’ actions and rules ought to be excluded from the
application of antitrust laws.  Finally, Section V will conclude that
both jurisdictions maintain a de facto exemption for professional
sports.
II. THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
In the business of professional sports, clubs act as both buyers
and sellers.  For example, they sell not only tickets to matches, but
also other related products, such as team-branded merchandise and
broadcasting rights.  When a sports organization controls access to
all of its matches and fulfills all of the demand for that product, it
can prevent other entities from becoming competitors; this is mo-
nopoly power.7  As buyers in the professional sports market, clubs
purchase the services of athletes, other labor, and the use of sport-
ing venues like arenas and stadiums.  When there is only one buyer
amongst many sellers, otherwise known as a monopsony, that buyer
can dictate terms to sellers, because the sellers have no other con-
sumers.  In professional sports, if an athlete wants to compete in a
league, he or she must abide by the rules of that league, the sole
buyer for his skills.  When teams collectively decide not to do busi-
ness with someone, they are exercising their monopsony powers.8
7. See generally Catalano, supra note 3 (discussing ways antitrust law applies to R
sports organizations, specifically control of market power).
8. See generally Catalano, supra note 3 (applying antitrust to professional R
sports).
3
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Professional sports organizations create monopolies and mo-
nopsonies within their respective sports through agreements be-
tween the teams made primarily to maintain competitive balance
between teams.  Because the product offered for consumption is
the match itself,9 an economically monopolistic club will not be suc-
cessful because, if it effectively eliminates the existence of weaker
teams, as a monopoly does, it will be left with no on-field competi-
tors.  This infeasibility is because the value of what any one team has
to offer to consumers cannot be delivered on its own, and the more
equally matched the teams are the more valuable the match is.10
Economic cooperation between clubs is done with the purpose of
maintaining athletically balanced competition between them.
Without such balance, there is no product for sale.11  Thus, eco-
nomic cooperation—instead of economic competition—between
clubs is necessary for the continued existence of both the leagues
and the individual clubs.12  Such economic cooperation is the part
of professional sports that is forbidden by antitrust laws.
A. The U.S. Model
Through an economic joint venture structure,13 leagues col-
lude to achieve competitive balance by imposing three kinds of
rules: “(1) rules governing the ownership and acquisition of player
contracts, (2) rules governing territorial rights, and (3) rules gov-
erning television and radio contracts.”14  Agreements to behave col-
lectively in each of these areas replace, for example, individual
teams competing for the most talented players who are new to the
league.  By cooperating economically, a professional sports league
9. See Jeffery Borland & Robert MacDonald, Demand for Sport, 19 OXFORD REV.
OF ECON. POL’Y 478, 479 (2003).
10. See Stefan Szymanski, The Assessment: The Economics of Sport, 19 OXFORD
REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 467, 471 (2003) (“[D]emand is increasing in the degree of
uncertainty of the contest outcome, a claim which is largely supported by the very
limited demand for delayed transmission of sports broadcasting rights—once the
outcome of contest is known, viewers have quite limited interest in watching the
match . . . .”).
11. See Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports: A Contribu-
tion to the Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market Competition, 78 Q.J.
OF ECON. 1, 3 (1964) (discussing product of professional sports). But see Borland &
MacDonald, supra note 9, at 487 (quoting Stefan Szymanski, The Economic Design of R
Sporting Contests, 41 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1137, 1156 (2003)).
12. See Neale, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing need for competition and collu- R
sion in professional sports).
13. See Ross, supra note 2 (discussing traditional structure of professional R
sports leagues).
14. Mohamed Eh-Hodiri & James Quirk, An Economic Model of a Professional
Sports League, 79 J. OF POL. ECON. 1302, 1304 (1971).
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“is a unique business, containing an unusual but necessary mixture
of interparticipant competition and cooperation not found in any
other kind of partnership or joint venture.”15  The joint venture
structure alone does not insulate league actions from the antitrust
laws—agreements completed through a joint venture can consti-
tute illegal cartel behavior if they unreasonably constrain
competition.16
B. The European Model
Leagues are the main actors in antitrust actions in the US, but
in Europe, SGBs are accused of acting anti-competitively more
often than are Europe’s professional leagues.  SGBs, similar to
leagues, regulate the competitive balance between teams or com-
petitors.  Like leagues, they promulgate rules dictating the rules of
the game (lex ludica), eligibility for participating athletes, and trans-
fer rules dictating when and how athletes may change teams.  Be-
cause SGBs operate hierarchically, their rules apply to everyone
participating in a sport, including professionals, thereby affecting
the business of professional sports and not simply the sport itself.
Therefore, SGBs have a monopoly over their respective sports in
Europe.17
Due to their apparent monopoly power, the actions of profes-
sional sports organizations in the US and Europe have consistently
been challenged on the basis that their agreements harm others,
usually athletes.  In response, the organizations have sought special
treatment or exemption from their respective antitrust laws based
on their structure and the special characteristics of professional
sports.18
III. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS UNDER THE US ANTITRUST LAWS
In the US, the Sherman Act is the primary federal antitrust
statute.  It “prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade and monopo-
15. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity
Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25, 29 (1991) (noting one argument
of single-entity defense advocates to application of antitrust in professional sports).
16. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 113 (1984) [hereinafter Board of Regents] (“[J]oint ventures have no immu-
nity from the antitrust laws . . . .”).
17. See, e.g., FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players, 7-8 (2012),
available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/
01/95/83/85//regulationsstatusandtransfer_e.pdf (stating that regulations are
global, binding, and applicable to all soccer players).
18. See Szymanski, supra note 10, at 1178-89. R
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lization” that affect trade between the states.19  Since its enactment
in 1890, the Sherman Act’s purpose has evolved.  Today it primarily
serves to “promote consumer welfare by enhancing economic effi-
ciency in commerce.”20
Anyone harmed by the actions of a sports team or league in the
US can challenge that team or league’s anticompetitive behavior
under the Sherman Act as an illegal restraint of interstate trade.21
Courts consider certain types of agreements to be per se violations of
the Sherman Act, whereas in other cases they will apply the Rule of
Reason and consider the market circumstances of an agreement.
The Rule of Reason demands that courts balance the anticompeti-
tive effects of an agreement with its pro-competitive benefits.22  Pro-
fessional sports leagues have benefitted from the application of the
Rule of Reason when their actions have been challenged as an-
ticompetitive with courts refusing to apply the per se rule.23
Among the four major professional sports leagues in the US,
the National Football League (“NFL”), National Hockey League
(“NHL”), Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Basket-
ball Association (“NBA”), only baseball enjoys a general exemption
from the Sherman Act.24  These leagues have highly similar joint-
venture structures.25  However, baseball gained a non-statutory ex-
emption in an early case now considered a legal anomaly, but which
has nevertheless been upheld for nearly a century.26  Baseball’s ex-
emption is rooted in an antiquated interpretation of “trade and
commerce,”27 but was perpetuated by sentiment for its place in soci-
19. Christian Dennie, Is Clarett Correct? A Glance at the Purview of the Antitrust
Labor Exemption, 6 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 10 (2005) (citing Sherman Anti-
trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2004)).
20. See id. at 10.
21. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
22. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695-96 (1978)
(discussing competitive bidding in relation to Sherman Act).
23. See Lacie L. Kaiser, The Flight from Single Entity Structured Sports Leagues, 2 J.
OF SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3-4 (2004), available at http://laworgs.depaul
.edu/journals/sports_law/Documents/Kaiser%20leagues.pdf (discussing applica-
tion of rule of reason analysis to professional sports).
24. It is worth noting that MLB, NHL, and the NBA (and Major League Soc-
cer) have teams in the United States and Canada, making their operations interna-
tional.  However, under the Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.
sec. 6a (1988), they remain subject to U.S. antitrust laws if their activities affect the
U.S. market.
25. See Szymanski, supra note 10, at 1150. R
26. For a further discussion of baseball’s antitrust exemption, see infra Sec-
tion III.B.
27. See Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs v. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt.,
Inc., 269 F. 681, 684-685 (D.C. Cir. 1920) [hereinafter Federal Baseball] (holding
6
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ety.28  Based on judicial precedents, the remaining three leagues
enjoy no antitrust exemption.29  Yet newer leagues, like Major
League Soccer (“MLS”), could be exempt from antitrust scrutiny
based on their structure.
A. Professional Sports are Generally Subject to the Sherman Act
Because the Supreme Court decisions of Federal Baseball,30 Tool-
son,31 and Flood, discussed infra,32 only apply to baseball, courts have
only addressed the antitrust status of other professional sports as
disputes have arisen.  The Federal District Court for the District of
Massachusetts stated in 1972 that it is “highly probable and well-
nigh a certainty, that all professional sports operating interstate
eventually will be ruled by the Supreme Court to be subject to the
federal antitrust statutes.”33  Professional basketball conducts inter-
state trade and is therefore subject to the Sherman Act.34 Radovich
v. National Football League found that the business of professional
football is interstate in nature, and thus was subject to the Sherman
Act.35  Professional hockey is also presumed (without a Supreme
Court ruling) to be subject to the Sherman Act in its collusive ac-
tions through the NHL.36  All of these professional sports leagues’
actions fall under the Sherman Act because they affect interstate
commerce, and are therefore capable of affecting competition by
behaving like a cartel or a monopoly.
baseball exempt from antitrust violation), aff’d, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), reh’g granted,
42 S. Ct. 587 (1922).
28. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
29. See Dennie, supra note 19, at 11. R
30. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (ruling Sherman
Antitrust Act does not apply to professional baseball).
31. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (upholding baseball’s
antitrust exemption).
32. For a further discussion of the Court’s decision in Flood, see infra Section
III.B.
33. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n. v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass.
1972) (citing to Court’s decision in Flood v. Kuhn, which notes that professional
sports, other than baseball, operating in interstate commerce are not exempt from
federal antitrust law).
34. See Washington Prof’l Basketball Corp. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 147 F.
Supp. 154, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and de-
claring professional basketball is subject to federal antitrust laws).
35. See Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (holding that
professional football is in business of interstate commerce, thus subject to federal
antitrust laws).
36. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 348 F. Supp. at 267-68 (refuting professional
hockey team’s argument that Standard Player Contract in question is exempt from
Sherman Act).
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This series of cases have not put to rest the argument from
professional sports leagues that their industry is unique in ways that
ought to exempt it from the application of the Sherman Act.37  One
prominent argument is that professional sports leagues are single
entities and therefore not capable of collusive behavior.  This pro-
position has been extensively discussed.
1. Is a Professional Sports League More Like a Cartel or a Single
Entity?
The need for any antitrust exemption for sports leagues and
clubs in the US hinges largely on whether the economic structure
of a league is considered a collection of independent firms or a
single entity.  Cartel behavior is contrary to Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.  However, if the clubs are considered a single entity under
the league’s umbrella, their actions would not be subject to Section
1 of the Sherman Act.38  Treating sports leagues as single entities
for the purpose of antitrust laws arises from Copperweld Corporation v.
Independence Tube Corporation, which held that firms cannot collude
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act when their relationship
is that of a parent company and its subsidiary.39
Gary Roberts advocates that sports leagues should be treated as
a single entity because “member teams in a sports league are inher-
ently incapable (so long as they remain members of any league) of
having legitimate economic interests independent of and in con-
flict with those of the league.”40  Since they would cease to exist
without a league, clubs cannot be considered independent firms,
only the league can be the entity that engages in “anticompetitive”
business decisions that sports antitrust cases address.41  Roberts has
37. See, e.g., L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 519 F.
Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (holding NFL is not single economic entity for pur-
poses of Sherman Act); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 874
F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding NBA is joint venture of teams capable of
collusion under Section 1 of Sherman Act); Robertson v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 67
F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (concluding joint venture structure does not make
NBA immune from antitrust laws); American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 506
U.S. 183 (2010). See also infra Section III.A.2.
38. Gary R. Roberts, The Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64 TUL. L.
REV. 117, 119-20 (1989) (discussing single-entity defense and proper way to frame
issue of antitrust laws as applied to professional sports).  Leagues may still be sub-
ject to Section 2 of the Sherman Act for abuses of monopoly power. See id.
39. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 778
(1984) (determining antitrust violation in relation to parent and subsidiary
company).
40. See Roberts, supra note 38, at 126. R
41. See id. at 119-20.
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interpreted Copperweld to mean that “single entity” includes com-
mercial relationships more decentralized than a parent and subsidi-
ary relationship, including those of a league and member teams as
long as the “group of related ‘persons’ has a common interest” re-
gardless of the “organizational form adopted in the pursuit of opti-
mal efficiency.”42
On the contrary, Michael Jacobs argues that this interpretation
of Copperweld is too broad because the case only applies to parent-
subsidiary relationships and nothing further.43  Under Jacobs’ view,
most professional sports leagues are joint ventures, and, since the
clubs still have separate ownership and management and are sepa-
rate legal entities, they are not linked closely enough to escape sec-
tion 1.44
Federal courts in the US have been divided on whether leagues
are single entities or cartels under antitrust laws.45  Recently,
though, the US Supreme Court has decided that the NFL is not a
single entity, a decision that is almost certainly applicable to the
NBA and NHL, as well.
2. Despite Special Characteristics, Leagues Are Not Single Entities
In American Needle, a licensed manufacturer of NFL team-
branded hats claimed that the NFL’s decision to exclusively license
its intellectual property to Reebok to put on apparel unlawfully re-
strained trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.46  The
NFL argued that National Football League Properties (NFLP), the
organization formed to market the teams’ individually owned intel-
lectual property, was a single entity for the purposes of the Sher-
man Act and, thus, the NFLP was exempt from its application.47
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit accepted this argument, finding that Copperweld applied and
42. See id. at 139.
43. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 35-44 (discussing Copperweld); see also Thomas A. R
Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV.
889, 924 (1999) (arguing that courts and commentators have “failed to recognize
that in a joint venture, competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive.”).
44. Jacobs, supra note 15, at 40 (arguing that professional sports, as joint-ven- R
tures, fail to satisfy Copperweld test and post-Copperweld tests).
45. See Piraino, supra note 43, at 893, nn.15-17 (citations omitted) (citing to R
relevant case law discussing professional sports leagues use of single-entity
defense).
46. American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 187-88 (2010)
(discussing background of case and relevant claims).
47. See id. at 187 (discussing how teams have own intellectual property).
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the NFLP was a single entity.48  The issue before the Supreme Court
was whether NFLP was acting as a single entity when it gave an ex-
clusive, 10-year contract to Reebok, or if this was actually an agree-
ment or combination in restraint of trade.49
The Court overturned the Seventh Circuit and held that the
Sherman Act applies to cooperative acts between NFL teams be-
cause they are not a single entity when they join together into a
league or the NFLP.50  The decision recognizes that sports have
“special characteristics” that require cooperation between clubs
without which the product (matches and championships) could not
exist;51 however, it finds that the marketing of intellectual property
is not an area that requires such cooperation in order for the
league to exist.52  Therefore, it concludes, agreements between
competing NFL teams are subject to the Sherman Act under the
“flexible Rule of Reason.”53  That is, the NFL will have the opportu-
nity to defend its monopolistic actions as necessary to market its
product.54  The NFL, and likely the NBA and NHL, cannot be ex-
empt from the Sherman Act as a single entity, but its decisions can
fall short of violating it based on the special characteristics of the
industry.
American Needle represents a rejection of the argument that
sports leagues ought to be considered single entities under Cop-
perweld, as Roberts and his supporters advocate.  Professional clubs
in the US, organized as independent firms jointly creating leagues,
are not single entities, despite sharing some common economic in-
terests. Under the Rule of Reason any agreements made between
48. The Seventh Circuit determined that Copperweld demands that “when
making a single-entity determination, courts must examine whether the conduct in
question deprives the marketplace of the independent sources of economic con-
trol that competition assumes.”  It furthermore found that “only one source of
economic power controls the promotion of NFL football; it makes little sense to
assert that each individual team has the authority, if not the responsibility, to pro-
mote the jointly produced NFL football,” and therefore that the NFL was “a single
entity for the purpose of licensing.” See American Needle, 538 F.3d at 742-44.
49. American Needle, 560 U.S. at 195 (applying antitrust law to facts of case).
50. See id. at 200 (discussing single-entity).  Justice Stevens wrote for the unan-
imous Court: “The question is whether the agreement joins together ‘independent
centers of decision making.’ If it does, the entities are capable of conspiring under
§ 1, and the court must decide whether the restraint of trade is an unreasonable
and therefore illegal one.” Id. at 196 (citations omitted).
51. See id. at 200 (discussing single-entity).
52. See id. at 200 n.7 (“[E]ven if leaguewide agreements are necessary to pro-
duce football, it does not follow that concerted activity in marketing intellectual
property is necessary to produce football.”).
53. Id. at 203.
54. See id. (elaborating upon rule of reason analysis)
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teams, like other joint ventures, must be judged on their competi-
tive effects.55
American Needle is a very sound and reasoned opinion.  The lan-
guage of Copperweld might have left open the possibility that any two
persons acting with a unity of interests ought to be considered a
single entity, but the Court wisely decided that was simply too broad
of a conclusion.  Had the Court not narrowed Copperweld, all cartels
could be exempt from the Sherman Act, not just sports-related
agreements, rendering the statute useless.  As such, an interpreta-
tion limiting the reach of Copperweld to sports, and other potentially
anticompetitive agreements, was necessary and correct.  Roberts’
proposed expansion of the single entity doctrine to include profes-
sional sports leagues is fascinating, but its implications would have
simply been too broad: virtually any joint venture would have
sought protection for their cartel behavior from the Sherman Act
based primarily on their corporate form.
B. Professional Baseball is Generally Exempt
From Antitrust Laws
Baseball holds a special place in American culture.  Nowhere is
this more blatant than the beginning of the Supreme Court’s ma-
jority opinion in Flood v. Kuhn.56  Titled “The Game,” it is a senti-
mental retrospective of baseball in America’s cultural history,
tracing baseball’s origins, listing its most famous players, referenc-
ing famous poems about the game, and eventually acknowledging
that all of these things have made baseball the “national pastime.”57
Flood sends a message through its dicta that the Court views profes-
sional sports (or at least baseball) as something beyond a mere busi-
ness and actually as a reflection of national identity.
Partly due to this attitude towards baseball, the Court has
granted and upheld baseball’s non-statutory exemption from the
Sherman Act, which originated in Federal Baseball Club v. National
League, decided in 1922.58 Federal Baseball arose out of the failure of
the Federal League, created to compete with the combined Na-
55. Meir Feder, Is There Life After Death for Sports League Immunity? American
Needle and Beyond, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 407, 408 (2011) (discussing Court’s
decision in American Needle).
56. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-4 (1972) (celebrating history of pro-
fessional baseball).
57. Id. at 264 (expanding upon baseball’s special place in hearts of
Americans).
58. See generally Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. 200 (addressing application of anti-
trust law to professional baseball).
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tional and American baseball leagues (later known collectively as
Major League Baseball) at the highest level of baseball inside the
US.  In Federal Baseball, the court decided that, even though baseball
teams travel over state lines to play each other, the travel was merely
incidental and the commerce that occurred in the act of the games
themselves was not interstate in nature.  Therefore, the business of
professional baseball was not subject to the prohibitions laid out in
the Sherman Act.59  As such, none of the actions between the clubs
that might otherwise be considered monopolistic or collusive were
subject to federal antitrust law.
The Supreme Court upheld baseball’s antitrust exemption
thirtys years later in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.60  Although
Toolson upheld the exemption, it was a per curiam decision in which
Justice Burton wrote a short dissent pointing out that the character-
ization of professional baseball’s activities as being only incidentally
interstate was not, in 1953, an accurate depiction of the business of
baseball.61  It is important to highlight that Burton seemed to agree
with the majority, though, that due to “the high place [baseball]
enjoys in the hearts of our people, and the possible justification of
special treatment for organized sports which are engaged in inter-
state trade or commerce, the authorization of such treatment is a
matter within the discretion of Congress.”62  Congress, subse-
quently, took no action.
The Flood case subsequently addressed baseball’s antitrust ex-
emption by challenging baseball’s standard, league-wide reserve
clauses in player contracts—clauses that acted as an agreement be-
tween teams that restrained competition between them for play-
ers.63  In its decision, the Supreme Court “acknowledged that the
doctrine [of baseball’s antitrust exemption in Federal Baseball] was
‘an exception and an anomaly,’ and repudiated the original justifi-
cation for the exemption by holding that ‘baseball is a business and
59. See id. at 208-09 (holding professional baseball exempt from federal anti-
trust law because interstate commerce is “incidental”).
60. See generally Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per
curiam) (citing Congress’s 30 years of inaction after Federal Baseball as tacit accept-
ance of baseball’s exemption.).
61. See id. at 360 (Burton, J., dissenting) (referring to Court’s discussion of
interstate commerce in Flood).
62. Id. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress did not explicitly
exempt baseball from Sherman Act).
63. Szymanski, supra note 10, at 472 (discussing baseball’s reserve clause, R
which prevents players from moving to another team unless current team expressly
consents to the move).
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it is engaged in interstate commerce.’”64  In spite of this, the Court
found that, in the interest of stare decisis and due to Congress’s con-
tinued inaction on the subject, it would respect the Federal Baseball
precedent, uphold baseball’s antitrust exemption, and rule against
Curt Flood’s request to no longer be bound by the reserve clause in
his contract.  The Court held that Federal Baseball is wrong, but the
wrong had lasted so long—50 years—that the Court could no
longer make it right.65
In response to this decision, as well as to a specific provision in
the 1995 players’ contract with the league that requested congres-
sional intervention, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act of 1998.
The Flood Act eliminated baseball’s antitrust exemption, but only
as it applies to labor relations with players.66  Baseball players’ re-
serve clauses were eliminated in the 1970s, allowing players to be-
come free agents after 6 years of playing under a contract.67
Though these were major steps forward in the critical area of labor
relations with players, the antitrust exemption for baseball remains
in effect as to labor relations with other groups, like umpires, and
in all other respects.68  In short, it remains law that the Sherman
Act does not apply to the actions of MLB, except with respect to the
players’ union.
Baseball’s exemption does not currently provide any substan-
tial economic advantages over other major league sports in the US,
as evidenced by the revenues of the four largest leagues,69 so main-
64. See Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 49 AM. BUS.
L.J. 211, 214 (2012) (quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 282).
65. See Roger I. Abrams, Before the Flood: The History of Baseball’s Antitrust Exemp-
tion, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 307, 312 (1999) (noting Congress’s role in baseball’s
antitrust exemption).
66. See Grow, supra note 64, at 240-41 (discussing Curt Flood Act). R
67. Id. at 241-42 (discussing free agency imposed after passage of Curt Flood
Act).
68. See James B. Dworkin & Richard A. Posthuma, Professional Sports Collective
Bargaining in the Spotlight, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 217,
230 (Paul F. Clark et al., eds., 2002) (discussing collective bargaining in sports).  It
should also be noted that umpires have collective bargaining rights within the
league. See id.; see also Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451 (“[W]e now specifically limit the
rule there established [in Toolson and Federal Baseball] to the facts there involved,
i.e., the business of organized professional baseball.”).
69. See Cork Gaines, Sports Chart of the Day: NFL Revenue is Nearly 25% More
Than MLB, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/sports-
chart-of-the-day-nfl-revenue-still-dwarfs-other-major-sports-2012-10 (stating 2012
league revenues: NFL: $9.5 billion, MLB: $7.7 billion, NBA: $4.3 billion, NHL: $3.2
billion); see also Stern Estimates NBA Revenue Up 20 Percent to $5B, NBA.COM (Nov. 13,
2012), http://www.nba.com/2012/news/11/13/stern-nba-revenue.ap/index.html
(stating league revenues for 2012 season as NFL: $9 billion, MLB: $7.5 billion,
NBA: $5 billion, and NHL $3.3 billion).
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taining it seems pointless.  However, eliminating its exemption ac-
tually could harm consumers because of baseball’s minor league
system.  Freed of the constraints of the Sherman Act, including de-
cisions allowing baseball to protect minor league club territories
and subsidies, MLB has created a development system for future
big-leaguers that restricts vertical and horizontal economic compe-
tition between major and minor league clubs.70  If MLB’s exemp-
tion were to be eliminated, the minor leagues could crumble,
ultimately reducing the output of professional baseball games avail-
able to consumers, producing the opposite result than what is de-
sired in antitrust cases.71  Though baseball’s exemption is based on
an entirely outdated interpretation of interstate commerce and sim-
ply remains a curiosity in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,72 in
at least this one substantial respect, its reversal would harm consum-
ers, and therefore it should not be eliminated.73
C. MLS May Avoid Antitrust Scrutiny as a Single Entity
Major League Soccer has utilized Copperweld and the single en-
tity doctrine to help shield its operations from antitrust scrutiny.74
The MLS was designed to conform to the single entity exception to
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.75  Among other features,
the League itself owns all of the teams (allowing investors only to
operate teams, not own them), all intellectual property connected
to MLS and the teams, the tickets to games, and the broadcast
rights.76  “This gives them centralized control over nearly all profits
generated by the league.  Additionally, the league controls all of the
revenues and is responsible for paying the salaries of league person-
70. Grow supra note 64, at 256-57, 256 n.234 (discussing NBA, NHL, and MLB R
minor leagues).
71. See id. at 257-59 (discussing difficulty of applying antitrust law to minor
league baseball).
72. See Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass. 1972) (“The opinions of the
Court make it more than abundantly clear that the granting of immunity under
the antitrust laws to the sport of baseball is a historical accident and an anomaly
based on historical rather than legal or even rational grounds.”).
73. See Grow, supra note 64, at 255-59. But see Morgen A. Sullivan, “A Derelict R
in the Stream of the Law”: Overruling Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 48 DUKE L.J. 1265,
1304 (1999) (stating that Supreme Court should dispose of baseball exception).
74. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter “Fraser II”]; see also Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984)  (holding that
a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring
with each other for purposes of §1 of Sherman Act).
75. See Bryan A. Green, Can Major League Soccer Survive Another Antitrust Chal-
lenge? Emerging Threats to its Single Entity Treatment, 4 INT’L SPORTS L. REV. 79, 80-82
(2009) (discussing formation of Major League Soccer).
76. See id. at 82 (defining important aspects of MLS structure).
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nel, referees, and players.”77  Players also negotiate their salaries
with MLS, not their respective teams, which gives the league exten-
sive control over which team each individual player will play for and
ensures a competitive balance.78  These features make it unneces-
sary for the teams to create agreements among themselves that may
unreasonably restrain competition.
After its formation in the 1990s, MLS faced an antitrust test in
Fraser v. MLS, where the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
stopped short of determining whether MLS could have violated
Section 1 based on its structure.79  However, the trial court, in a
decision for partial summary judgment, decided MLS could not
have violated Section 1 as a matter of law, holding there was “an
insufficient basis in the record for concluding that operators have
divergent economic interests within MLS’s structure,” and thus, the
League should be treated as a single entity.80
Despite MLS being a single entity, some of its new endeavors
might threaten that characterization in the future, though it is not
clear where the line between single entity and joint venture may lie
for professional soccer in the US.81  Learning from all of the anti-
trust challenges professional sports leagues have faced in the past,
MLS has managed to avoid similar consequences by structuring it-
self as quite a novel arrangement for US professional sports thus
far.  MLS is thereby exempting itself from the effective application
of antitrust laws to its actions as a league.
77. Id. at 82-83.
78. See id. at 83 (explaining best example of MLS’s centralized control that
sets it apart from other leagues).
79. Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 59 (“[E]ven if we assume that section 1 applies, it is
clear to us that the venture cannot be condemned by per se rules and presents at
best a debatable case under the rule of reason”).
80. Green supra note 75, at 85 (quoting Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., R
97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D. Mass. 2000) [hereinafter “Fraser I”]). The district court
in Fraser I held that MLS and its investors should be treated as a single entity. See
id.
81. See id. at 87-91 (citing Fraser II, 284 F.3d at 58) (“Perhaps the most persua-
sive factor that the court considered is that the investor-operators are able to sell
the rights to their team (though limitations do apply). This is significantly differ-
ent from common shares in the league as a whole, and as a result, the court deter-
mined that the investor-operators do not act with the same unity of interests that
was controlling in the Copperweld case. This led the court to state that the structure
of the league was closer to a collaborative joint venture as opposed to a single
entity.”).
15
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D. The Rule of Reason as a De Facto Exemption
from Antitrust Scrutiny
Because of the Federal Baseball decision and the special treat-
ment professional baseball has since received under the Sherman
Act,82 and due to the structure of MLS,83 each sports league is sub-
ject to individual antitrust analysis.84  After American Needle, though,
it appears to be settled that the NFL, NHL, and NBA’s decisions
and agreements (excluding those pertaining to broadcasting rights
and collective bargaining) are subject to Rule of Reason scrutiny.85
The Rule of Reason is an alternative to declaring that a particular
action is anticompetitive on its face.  US law applies the Rule of
Reason in sports cases because of a general recognition that with-
out horizontal agreements between clubs, no club could produce
its product.86  This is an adoption of Judge Bork’s enduring and
sensible argument cited in the Board of Regents case: “[S]ome activi-
ties can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading example is
league sports.  When a league of professional lacrosse teams is
formed, it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on
the ground that there are no other professional lacrosse teams.”87
Thus, in complicated situations necessitating horizontal coopera-
tion, the application of the relatively simple per se rule would be
inappropriate because it cannot take into account the complexities
of sports leagues.
The Rule of Reason is not easily applied to sports either.  It was
created in early decisions that applied the Sherman Act,88 and was
82. For a further discussion of Federal Baseball, see supra Section III.B. and
accompanying notes.
83. For a further discussion of the structure of the MLS and the application of
the Sherman Act to the MLS, see supra Section III.C, and accompanying notes.
84. See supra Section III.A. and accompanying notes.
85. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
86. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 101 (1984) (“[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all”).
87. Id. (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 278 (1978)).
88. See Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 67 (1911) (finding applica-
tion of rule of reason that dates back 100 years prior to this decision); see also
Consultants & Designers, Inc. v. Butler Serv. Grp., Inc., 720 F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1983) (applying Rule of Reason to alleged Sherman Act violation regarding
employment contract).
Notwithstanding the vastness and variety of cases, the touchstone of this
analysis has not varied since the grandfather case of Mitchell v. Reyn-
olds. . . . Lord Macclesfield applied a “reasonableness” or balancing test
which has survived, with many enlightening applications, to this day. We
thus sail into that cherished legal haven, “Is it reasonable under the
circumstances?”
16
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described with great care by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very es-
sence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint im-
posed is such as merely regulates, and perhaps thereby
promotes competition, or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition. To determine that
question, the court must ordinarily consider the facts pe-
culiar to the business to which the restraint is applied, its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed, the
nature of the restraint, and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objection-
able regulation, or the reverse, but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.89
Over the ensuing decades, the detailed examination described
by Brandeis was reduced to a question of “whether the challenged
agreement is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses
competition.”90  The difference is profound: this test only considers
the economic impacts of a decision and disregards any “facts pecu-
liar to the business” or “the purpose or end sought to be attained”
by the restraint as Chicago Board of Trade encouraged.  By eliminat-
ing these elements of the Rule of Reason, it appeared that US
courts were not applying antitrust laws fairly to professional
sports.91  The American Needle case may have restored the special
treatment that sports receive under the antitrust laws.
In American Needle, Justice Stevens cites to Professional Engineers
as authority for the Rule of Reason, but he quotes Justice Brandeis’
previously noted description of the rule from Chicago Board of Trade
as the guide for what the Rule of Reason ought to entail.  The Su-
Id.
89. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
90. See Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
91. See Barry Wertheimer, Rethinking the Rule of Reason: From Professional Engi-
neers to NCAA, 6 DUKE L. J. 1297, 1321 (1984) (noting that mechanical application
of Prof’l Eng’rs led to disregard for non-economic justifications for restraints of
trade in sports cases, and therefore overbroad application of antitrust law under
Rule of Reason).
17
Farzin: On the Antitrust Exemption for Professional Sports in the United
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 54 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
36293-vls_22-1 Sheet No. 54 Side B      04/07/2015   08:38:16
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 18 31-MAR-15 11:06
92 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 75
preme Court did not have occasion to apply the Rule of Reason to
the facts in American Needle, instead the Court ordered the lower
court to do so on remand, but the reference to Chicago Board of
Trade indicates a swing back towards a more comprehensive Rule of
Reason analysis for antitrust sports cases.92  Furthermore, affording
all sports antitrust cases the benefit of Rule of Reason scrutiny
greatly decreases the chances that any plaintiff will succeed in an
antitrust challenge against the leagues.93  Therefore, by virtually au-
tomatically granting sports comprehensive Rule of Reason scrutiny
in antitrust cases due to their unusual features, US courts may have
re-established the sporting exemption that leagues were expecting
to enjoy after Federal Baseball and Toolson, but was eliminated for all
but baseball in Radovich.94  By its method of analysis, the ECJ and
Commission have also managed to carve out a special place for
sports in Europe.
IV. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND EU COMPETITION LAW
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”) forbids anticompetitive behaviors amongst undertakings
in Article 101(1).95  Article 101(1) is always applicable to anticom-
92. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Li-
censing Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Na-
tional Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 203 (2011) (predicting NFL will
probably not be found liable under Sherman Act).
93. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (“[P]laintiffs almost never win
under the rule of reason. In 221 of 222 cases . . . the defendant won.”).
94. See generally Philip R. Bryce, The Sherman Act and Professional Team Sports:
The NFL Rozelle Rule Invalid Under the Rule of Reason: Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), 9 CONN. L. REV. 336, 337 (1977) (acknowl-
edging that Toolson exemption only applied).
95. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 101(1), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter “TEFU”] (not-
ing prohibited anti-competitive agreements and practices).  The general language
of section 101 states:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of un-
dertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market . . .
Id. .; see also TFEU art. 102 (prohibiting abuse of undertaking’s dominant posi-
tion).  It is also important to note that the TFEU renumbered many articles. See
generally The Lisbon Treaty: A Guide for In-House Lawyers, OUT-LAW.COM (Dec. 1,
2009), http://www.out-law.com/page-10566 (acknowledging renumbering of arti-
cles and highlighting some main changes).  This Article will refer to them by the
current numbers.  Similarly, past cases and scholarship refer to European Commu-
nity (EC) Law; for the purposes of this Article the term is interchangeable with EU
law.
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petitive agreements, and is subject only to the exceptions described
in Article 101(3).96  Those exceptions apply when an agreement im-
proves the production or distribution of goods, shares the benefit
of the efficiency with consumers, all while not imposing any restric-
tions that are “not indispensable to the attainment of these objec-
tives” and that do not eliminate competition.97  EU competition law
applies to commercial activities, including the commercial activities
of sporting activities.  It follows that Article 101 restrains any gov-
erning body that makes rules affecting professional sports, despite a
desire to remain autonomous.98  The Commission and the ECJ rec-
ognize the special characteristics and societal place of sports in Eu-
rope.  On these bases, the ECJ has recently determined that sports
rules that potentially violate Article 101(1) should be treated with
more leniency, despite eliminating the pure sporting rule
exemption.
A. EU Law Applies to Sports
The question of whether EU competition law provides for any
exemption for sports must begin with the broader inquiry of
whether any EU law applies to the actions of sports organizations.
Early cases dealt with the applicability of all of European Commu-
nity (“EC”) law to sports, not only the competition laws, but they
remain relevant to the place of sports under EU competition law.
As the European Commission and the ECJ have addressed cases
96. See TFEU art. 101(3).
The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of: any agreement or category of agreements between undertak-
ings, any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertak-
ings, any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibil-
ity of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the prod-
ucts in question.
Id.
97. Communication from the Commission Guidelines on the Application of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty, 27 April 2004, O.J. (C 101) para. 9, at 97, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52004XC04
27(07)&from=EN (explaining exceptions and their application).
98. Alfonso Rinco´n, EC Competition and Internal Market Law: On the Existence of
a Sporting Exemption and its Withdrawal, 3 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 224, 226 (2007)
(citing Borja Garcia, From Regulation to Governance and Representation: Agenda-setting
and the EU’s Involvement in Sport, 5 ENT. & SPORTS L. J. 1 (2007)) (describing argu-
ment that sport as civil movement on fringe of public authority regulation should
remain self-governed).
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concerning athletes, sports clubs, and governing bodies, the appli-
cability of EU law has shifted.  When it first encountered a sports
rule that came up against EC law, the ECJ determined that certain
activities and decisions were purely of a sporting nature and non-
economic; therefore, EC law could not reach them.99  This was the
first example of a sports exemption under European law.  Subse-
quently, however, the state of that exemption for sporting activities
has eroded.  Currently, EU law contains no exemptions to its com-
petition laws for sports or sporting activities.100  Competition laws,
as part of European law, are applicable to sport only as far as their
commercial activities are concerned.101  Developments in EU law
and policy indicate that the Commission and the ECJ will apply EU
law to sports, but they are willing to consider broadly sport’s charac-
teristics in evaluating sporting rules under the competition laws.
Consequently, sports organizations enjoy a non-statutory method of
analyzing competition laws that takes into account non-commercial
considerations.
B. Meca-Medina Establishes Where Sports Organizations Stand
Under EU Competition Law
In Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission,102 the ECJ first di-
rectly addressed the applicability of EU competition laws to
sports.103  The facts concerned doping rules in long-distance swim-
ming competitions.  Two swimmers who had finished first and sec-
ond at a race tested positive for a banned substance in excess of the
limit set by the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) and the
International Swimming Federation (“FINA”), and were suspended
from competition for four years each.104  Their appeal at the Court
99. See Case 36/74, Walrave and Koch v. UCI, 1974 E.C.R. 1405, para. 4 (“The
practice of sport is subject to community law only in so far as it constitutes an
economic activity . . .”).
100. See Christine Stix-Hackl & Alexander Egger, Sports and Competition Law: A
Never-ending Story?, 23 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 81, 83 (2002).
101. See Case C-176/96, Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine
ASBL v. Fe´de´ration Royale Belge des Socie´te´s de Basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB), 2000
E.C.R. I-2681, para. 32 (citing Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1417).
102. Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-
06991.
103. See Robert Siekmann, The Specificity of Sport: Sporting Exceptions in EU Law,
49 COLLECTED PAPERS OF THE FAC. OF L. IN SPLIT 697, 714 (2012), available at http:/
/hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=138869&lang=en (dis-
cussing court’s confirmation that economic activities of sports fall within scope of
EC law).
104. See Meca-Medina and Majcen, 2006 E.C.R. at I-7006 para. 3 (providing
background information on case).
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of Arbitration for Sport was denied.  Instead of exercising their
right of appeal to the Swiss courts, they brought a claim to the Eu-
ropean Commission alleging that the anti-doping rules at issue were
the result of anticompetitive actions by the IOC, FINA, and the labs
that test for banned substances, in violation of TFEU Articles 101
and 102.105  The Commission found no violation of the competi-
tion laws, and held that the anti-doping rules did not violate Arti-
cles 101 and 102.106  The Court of First Instance (“CFI”) upheld
that denial on appeal, finding that doping rules are of a purely
sporting nature and solely within the discretion of sport’s governing
bodies.107  Furthermore, it determined that anti-doping rules are
not economic in nature and, therefore, the Commission’s conclu-
sion that Articles 101 and 102 did not apply to them was correct.108
The ECJ took a decidedly different view of the case and dis-
agreed with the conclusions reached by both the Commission and
the CFI.  The Court rejected its prior case of Walrave, which held
that pure sporting rules fall outside the jurisdiction of EU law (then
EC law). It found no basis for any exemption based on actions be-
ing of a purely sporting interest: “. . . [T]he mere fact that a rule is
purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from
the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity gov-
erned by that rule or the body which has laid it down.”109 A sport-
ing activity falls within the scope of the Treaty and is subject to the
entire TFEU when it is performed by professional or semi-profes-
sional athletes.110  Therefore, professional sports are subject to the
entire TFEU, including Articles 101 and 102.111  However, profes-
sional sports can escape violation of Article 101 based on their spe-
cial characteristics.
According to Meca-Medina, a sporting rule will not violate Arti-
cle 101 if it is related to the objectives of the rule, inherent to the
pursuit of those objectives, and proportional to the aim it seeks to
accomplish.112  In considering whether a sporting activity is in viola-
tion of the competition laws, the ECJ found that the method of
105. See id. at para. 2 (discussing plaintiff’s claims).
106. Id. at I-7012 (noting court rejected applicants’ complaint).
107. Id. at para. 9 (“[T]he prohibition of doping is based on purely sporting
considerations and therefore has nothing to do with any economic
consideration.”).
108. See id.
109. Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. at para. 27.
110. See id. at para. 23, 28.
111. See id. at para. 30.
112. See id. at para. 42.
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analysis utilized by the Commission and CFI was based on a princi-
ple of sporting activities being immune from competition law.  In-
stead, they ought to have only considered the sporting nature of the
rule later in their analyses as a possible defense to the application of
competition laws.113  Any analysis of a sporting rule therefore re-
quires a court to examine the rule itself under the competition laws
and not simply assume that its apparent sporting nature places it
outside the reach of the TFEU.  This rejects the notion established
in Walrave that “purely sporting rules” even exist when it comes to
European law.114
Applying this reasoning to the anti-doping rules at issue in the
case, the ECJ held the following:
[E]ven if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded
as a decision of an association of undertakings limiting the
appellants’ freedom of action, they do not, for all that,
necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incom-
patible with the common market, within the meaning of
Article [101 TFEU], since they are justified by a legitimate objec-
tive . . . inherent in the organisation and proper conduct of com-
petitive sport and its very purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry
between athletes.115
Meca-Medina’s significance stems from its conclusion that the
entirety of the TFEU applies to the activities of professional athletes
and their governing bodies regardless of their economic impact.
Yet, if a professional sporting rule is proportional and “inherent” to
a sporting objective, it could still avoid running afoul of the compe-
tition rules.  To pass muster under this standard, sports organiza-
tions “do not need to demonstrate a lack of economic impact [from
the sporting rules], merely that they were not primarily motivated by
economic considerations.”116  The judgment is clearly “of para-
mount importance for the application of [European] competition
113. See id. at paras. 33-34.
114. See Arnout Geeraert, Limits to the Autonomy of Sport: EU Law, in ACTION
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ORGANISATIONS 151, at 162 (Jens
Alm ed., 2013), available at http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/documents/
AGGIS_Geeraert_-_Limits_to_the_autonomy_of_sport.pdf (discussing free compe-
tition in EU sport).
115. Meca-Medina, 2006 E.C.R. I-7006, para. 45 (emphasis added) (noting
rules do not constitute restraint on trade).
116. Samuli Miettinen & Richard Parrish, Nationality Discrimination in Commu-
nity Law: An Assessment of UEFA Regulations Governing Player Eligibility for European
Club Competitions (The Home Grown Player Rule), 5 ENT. AND SPORTS L.J., para. 9
(2007) (emphasis added) available at http://go.warwick.ac.uk/eslj/issues/volume
5/number2/miettinen_parrish (citing Stephen Weatherill, Anti-Doping Revisited –
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law to the sport sector.”117  The full significance of Meca-Medina is
illuminated with a review of the history of sports under EU law
before this ECJ decision.
C. Pure Sporting Rules Under European Law
The Walrave designation of purely sporting rules was estab-
lished to distinguish certain actions of sports organizations from
their economic activities and was the basis for certain actions to be
fully outside the reach of EC law.  Over the decades since the
Walrave decision, the economic reach of sports in Europe ex-
panded, as has the EU’s legal reach; and, consequently, the notion
of a purely sporting rule fell away.  Understanding the nature of the
sporting exemption rejected by Meca-Medina is important because it
elucidates the significance of the current approach.
1. The ECJ Once Exempted Pure Sporting Rules as Non-economic in
Nature
The Walrave case established the exemption for sports rules
under EU law.118  The case concerned a rule requiring that the
pacemaker for a competing cyclist in a cycling event must be the
same nationality as the cyclist.  Mr. Walrave challenged this rule as
being contrary to EC law, but the ECJ decided that sport was subject
to EC law only when it constitutes an economic activity.119  Further-
more, the Court declared that rules governing the composition of a
national team, like the one at issue, are a question of a purely sport-
ing nature, and that European law does not reach such questions of
“purely sporting interest and as such [have] nothing to do with eco-
nomic activity.”120  The ECJ was attempting to sort the actions of
sporting organizations into two groups: purely sporting rules and
economic activities.  In determining whether a rule is of a purely
sporting interest, the court examines the intended impact of the
rule.  Was the rule in question imposed to regulate the sport itself
or sporting competitions, or was it enacted in order to impact an
economic outcome?121  Concluding that the nationality rule was im-
The Demise of the ‘Purely Sporting’ Rule, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 645, 645-57
(2006)).
117. Siekmann, supra note 103 at 714 (discussing Meca-Medina decision). R
118. See generally Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1405 (applying competition law to pro-
hibition on discrimination in EU sporting context).
119. See Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at 1417, para 4 (discussing background of case)
120. See Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. 1418, para 8 (stating prohibition does not in-
volve economin activity).
121. Rinco´n, supra note 98, at 227 (examining framework of exemption). R
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posed to regulate the sport itself, not to impact an economic out-
come, the ECJ that applying European law to the rule was
inappropriate.122  Subsequently, Dona` upheld the Walrave exemp-
tion based on the intent of the rule, which was that those rules
adopted for non-economic reasons and related to the “nature and
context of [sport] matches” are “of sporting interest only” and,
therefore, not subject to EC law.123
The ECJ judgments’ bases for this exemption were not entirely
clear, as even an ECJ Advocate General was unsure, stating
“[n]either the basis of the ‘exception’ nor its extent can be de-
duced with certainty from the [Walrave and Dona`] judgments.”124
Despite this uncertainty, the ECJ Advocate General nevertheless
recognized that an “exception” for sports exists in ECJ jurispru-
dence.125  The uncertainty in analyzing the Walrave and Dona` prece-
dents is based on the struggle of distinguishing between economic
and non-economic activity in sports activities, as the two are often
very closely interrelated.  This is especially true when the criteria
with which to make that distinction between activities are obscure
or nonexistent.  In Walrave and Dona`, the difficulty of determining
between economic and non-economic activity in sports became ap-
parent and subsequent decisions concerning the application of EU
law to sports gradually eliminated the concept of pure sporting
rules and exemptions.
Since Walrave, the economic aspect of sports in Europe has in-
creased, leading to new treatment under European law.126  Specifi-
cally, the Bosman decision arose out of the economic growth of
122. See Walrave, 1974 E.C.R. at Ruling para. 2 (discussing ECJ’s finding re-
garding application of EU law to present rule).
123. Case 13/76, Dona` v. Mantero, 1976 E.C.R. 1333, para. 14 (discussing
ruling upholding Walrave exception).
124. Op. of Advocate Gen., Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s
de Football Ass’n ASBL v. Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, para.139 [hereinafter “AG
Lenz”], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=14142
53241070&uri=CELEX:61993CC0415.
125. See id. (“[I]t appears to be a sort of limited exception as to scope.”).
126. See Stephen Weatherill, Resisting the Pressures of ‘Americanization’: The Influ-
ence of European Community Law on the ‘European Sport Model,’ in L. AND SPORT IN
CONTEMP. SOC’Y 157, 171 (Steve Greenfield & Guy Osborn eds., 2000) (“Increas-
ingly visible subjugation to [European] law flows naturally from the rising eco-
nomic significance of sport.”); see also RICHARD PARRISH, SPORTS L. AND POLICY IN
THE EUR. UNION 9 (Simon Bulmer et al eds., 2003).
The Commission appeared keen to avoid confrontation with the sports
world. A number of factors altered this position. The ruling in Bosman
acted as an important watershed. Even though in Bosman the ECJ did not
address the question of competition law and sport, instead focusing on
free movement principles, the Commission used the ruling to justify
greater scrutiny of sporting activity. Furthermore, competition law of-
24
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sports, primarily soccer, in Europe.  Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian
professional soccer player, challenged the UEFA’s international
transfer rules.127  Bosman claimed the international transfer rules
violated the Treaty’s freedom of movement for workers and anti-
trust rules.  Although it declined to rule on the antitrust claims, the
court still set important precedents in applying European law to
sports.128  The court held that the transfer rules violated Bosman’s
freedom of movement for employment purposes, because the trans-
fer fees were not connected closely enough to their stated purpose:
the cost of training young players.129  Thus, as Stephen Weatherill
points out, Bosman is an example of how individuals can force
change despite the lack of European Commission intervention:
“Bosman the litigant broke open, not simply a cartel within foot-
ball, but also a cartel between the football authorities and the Com-
munity’s regulatory authorities.”130
While Bosman recognized the existence of the sporting exemp-
tion, it did not extend that exemption to all sporting activities.  Yet,
the court failed to justify the bounds of the exemption.131  The
judgment acknowledged that European law applies to sports only so
far as economic activity is concerned; however, in determining
whether a rule concerns economic activity,132 the court shifted fo-
cus to the sporting organization’s justification of the rule instead of
analyzing the rule’s impact, thus, reaffirming Walrave.133  Weatherill
believes the court was “[building] a justification test into the appli-
cation of EC rules” in order to accommodate the soccer industry by
permitting some leeway in its restraint of competition in Europe.134
Contrarily, Alfonso Rinco´n believes the judgment is silent when it
comes to clarifying “when the conditions for granting the sporting
fered individual litigants a more cost-effective venue for redress than the
private enforcement route via national courts and the ECJ.
Id.
127. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-04921, paras. 6-19 (elaborating upon transfer
rules).
128. See id. para. 138 (noting decision not to interpret Treaty).
129. See id. para. 109 (discussing difficulty surrounding fees of training young
players).
130. See Weatherill, supra note 126, at 161-62 ( R
131. See Rinco´n, supra note 98, at 229 (discussing holding). R
132. See Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. para. 73 (distinguishing Walrave).
133. See id. para. 76 (“[If] rules or practices [are] justified on non-economic
grounds which relate to the particular nature and context of certain matches,”
then they are not reached by community law.”).
134. Weatherill, supra note 126, at 164. R
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exemption are met.”135  Thus, although the court indicated that
there are sports rules that European law does not reach,136 it made
no effort to specify how to distinguish them.  Furthermore, the ap-
plication of Articles 101 and 102 to sports in Europe has still not
been addressed by the ECJ.
Assuredly, the transfer rules did distort the market for soccer
players in Europe and restricted their legal right to cross borders in
search of better employment opportunities.  This direct impact on
the commercial aspect of soccer and the livelihood of players, justi-
fies the court’s decision to strike the transfer rules down under Eu-
ropean law.  The rules were also erecting national barriers, going
against a major goal of European integration.  Notwithstanding, the
court still missed an opportunity to more clearly establish the pa-
rameters for applying European law to sporting activities.  Subse-
quently, the Commission stepped in to try and clarify the
boundaries.
2. Commission Applied the Sporting Exemption to Competition Cases
After Bosman, the Commission heard many cases concerning
sporting rules and the Treaty’s antitrust rules.137  Due to the ECJ’s
vague guidance on when sports fall outside the scope of European
law, and despite its attempts to clarify the law,138 the Commission
struggled to determine how best to apply competition law to sports.
Eventually, the Commission embraced and expanded the sporting
exemption within competition law.139  Through the Directorate
General for Competition, the Commission clarified the “gray area”
left by the Bosman decision and gave sports organizations better gui-
dance on which activities may be subject to restraint under Articles
135. Rinco´n, supra note 98, at 228 (discussing exemption application since R
Walrave and Dona`).
136. See id. at 228-29 (analyzing sporting exemption further). “The sporting
exemption created by the ECJ in Walrave accords with what the sporting bodies
have in mind when they ask for autonomy. The substantiation of this line of rea-
soning would place the sporting bodies out of the reach of the EC Treaty.” Id. at
226 (footnote omitted).
137. See id. at 229 (discussing breadth of cases examined by Commission).
138. See Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission
to the European Council with a View to Safeguarding Sports Structures and Maintaining the
Social Significance of Sport within the Community Framework, COM (1999) 644 final,
Oct. 12, 1999, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=COM:1999:0644:FIN:EN:PDF (discussing attempts of ECJ to clarify
law) (suggesting ways to “reconcil[e] the economic dimension of sport with its
popular, educational, social and cultural dimensions”).
139. See Rinco´n, supra note 98, at 229-30 (discussing Commission’s accept- R
ance and application of exemption).
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101 and 102 TFEU.140  In doing so, the Commission established
precedents by explaining which sporting rules and activities would
be exempted from application of EU competition laws.141
First, the Commission recognized that sports organizations are
entitled to enact and enforce non-economic regulations that are,
therefore, outside the reach of European competition law because
such rules are “linked to the specific nature of sport.”142  Second, it
determined that “the rules of sports organisations that are neces-
sary to ensure equality between clubs, uncertainty as to results, and
the integrity and proper functioning of competitions are not, in
principle, caught by the Treaty’s competition rules.”143  Third, the
Commission said it would not investigate cases for competition law
violations if they do not appear to significantly affect trade between
member states.144
Going forward, then-Commissioner Mario Monti said the Com-
mission would draw a bright line between sporting actions that fall
either outside or inside of Articles 101 and 102 with its future deci-
sions, and also determine which actions are exempt from competi-
tion laws, though on a case-by-case basis.145  In a 2002 speech,
Monti specifically described the Commission’s role in enforcing
competition laws in the sporting sector, even referring to Meca-
Medina:
Sporting regulations such as the way championships are
organised, the way a coach structures his football team,
how a referee rules the field, whether a judo player is se-
lected to represent his or her country at the Olympic
Games or the suspension of a swimmer for having taken
doping substances is not the business of the Commission’s
140. Press Release, European Commission, Limits to Application of Treaty
Competition Rules to Sport: Commission Gives Clear Signal IP/99/965 (Dec. 9,
1999) [hereinafter IP/99/965], available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-99-965_en.htm#PR_metaPressRelease_bottom (discussing clarification of
Commission’s “grey area”).
141. See id. (discussing Commission’s guidelines).
142. See id. (discussing one aspect of Commission’s decision).
143. Id. (discussing second aspect of Commission’s decision).
144. See id. (discussing third aspect of Commission’s decision).  These prece-
dents were established in an unpublished commission decision, The Mouscron
Case, concerning the UEFA “at home and away from home” rule applicable to
soccer matches. See Commission White Paper on Sport, Annex I: Sport and EU Compe-
tition Rules, at 2.2.1.2 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/sport/white-paper/
swd-annex-i-sport-and-eu-competition-rules_en.htm#top.
145. IP/99/965, supra note 140 (summarizing framework application for dif- R
ferent categories).
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competition department and when we have received com-
plaints we rejected them.146
Despite this intention, in Meca-Medina, the ECJ decided that
the European competition laws do, in fact, reach precisely those
types of sporting regulations.  The full impact of the decision has
been debated.
D. Interpreting Meca-Medina
Commentators appear divided on whether the Meca-Medina de-
cision preserves the sports exemption or eliminates it.  Marios
Papaloukas proposes that it only slightly modifies the ECJ’s special
treatment of sports under European law, including competition
law, with the main adjustment being that sporting rules now must
be proportional to their aims.147  Similarly, Robert Siekmann writes
that Meca-Medina signaled that the ECJ would no longer justify ex-
emption from EU law based on the “purely sporting nature” of a
rule.  As evidence, Siekmann points out that the Court applied the
proportionality test from a non-sport case, Wouters, to a case about
sporting rules, demonstrating that “it finally could and should be
concluded that sport is not ‘special’ per se!”148
By contrast, Rinco´n is quite clear on the significance of Meca-
Medina with respect to the sporting exemption: “What it represents,
in fact, is a rejection of the sporting exemption as framed in
Walrave.”149  The decision eliminates the concept of exempting
sporting activities because they are not economic in nature, making
a general sporting exemption no longer possible.150  The Meca-Me-
dina decision represents the ECJ’s “converging analysis of sporting
practices under internal market and competition law.”151  That is,
146. Prof. Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy,
Competition and the Consumer: What are the Aims of European Competition Pol-
icy?, Speech at European Competition Day in Madrid 5 (Feb. 26, 2002).
147. See Marios Papaloukas, The Sporting Exemption Principle in the European
Court of Justice’s Case Law, 3-4 INT’L SPORTS L.J. 7, 10 (2008) (“After the Meca-Me-
dina case it is safe to say that a principle of relative sporting exemption from the
European Internal Market and Competition Rules has set a precedent in the ECJ’s
case law that will be followed in the future even if some further modifications are
accepted.”).
148. Robert Siekmann, The European Union and Sport: Is Sport “Special” in EU
Law and Policy?, at 10, available at sportslaw.ru/data/files/siekmann.doc (referring
to Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-
1577).
149. Rinco´n, supra note 98, at 235 (discussing benefits of Court’s decision in R
Meca-Medina).
150. See id. (examining Court’s decision in relation to Walrave and Dona`).
151. See id. at 237 (interpreting Court’s conclusions in Meca-Medina).
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the Court now accounts for sport’s special characteristics, not with
an exemption, but instead, with something more akin to an affirma-
tive defense: all sports rules are subject to the TFEU, but they can
be excepted from its application if they are proportional and not
commercially motivated.  This determination can be made only af-
ter a court or the Commission has examined the rules themselves
and the sports organization has explained its intent.  This change
has baffled some onlookers.
Writing on behalf of UEFA, Gianni Infantino is highly critical
of the decision.  Among other problems, he asserts that the ECJ
now holds that non-economic rules and actions are subject to EU
competition law “despite the fact that these . . . [t]reaty provisions
are only concerned with the economic relationships of competi-
tion.  It is very difficult to find logic in this.”152  By subjecting sport-
ing rules to EU competition law, the ECJ is reaching into the
workings of sports organizations, governing bodies, and the Court
of Arbitration for Sport, eroding their authority in what used to be
their sole purview.153  Overall, the Court
has shown little interest in defining more clearly the scope
of the sporting exception and has . . . moved in the oppo-
site direction in such a way that is likely to increase the
scope for legal uncertainty and result in more competition
law claims being levelled against sports bodies, often on
spurious grounds that have little if anything to do with the
functioning of economic competition in the European
Union.154
Contrary to Rinco´n’s belief that Meca-Medina created greater
certainty for sports organizations with respect to competition law,
Infantino concludes that it has done precisely the opposite.  Infan-
tino is probably correct on this count: when a court declines to
clearly state a legal rule and instead concludes that sports rules will
be assessed case-by-case, it decreases legal certainty for sporting
organizations.155
152. Gianni Infantino, Meca-Medina: A Step Backwards for the European Sports
Model and the Specificity of Sport? at 7, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www.uefa
.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/480391_DOWNLOAD.pdf
(providing perspective on Meca-Medina decision and its impact on anti-competitive
law).
153. See id. at 8 (noting trend towards transferring normal regulatory
functions).
154. Id. at 10 (stating policy implications and conclusions).
155. See, e.g., Rinco´n, supra note 98, at 236 (discussing how ECJ’s judgment R
lacks clarity and certainty).
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Romano Subiotto has also found great flaws in the ECJ’s deci-
sion, concluding that the decision demonstrated an “overbroad ap-
plication of European competition law in the [sports] sector.”156
The Court overreached by assuming the IOC and FINA were acting
as undertakings when they imposed and enforced anti-doping rules
for competitive swimming.  In his opinion, the IOC and FINA were
not acting as undertakings according to the ECJ’s own jurispru-
dence, thus no balancing test ought to have been applied.157  He
proposes, based on ECJ jurisprudence, that there be “a nexus be-
tween the activity, the decision, or the rule and the entity’s qualifi-
cation as an undertaking.”158  The ECJ’s decision demonstrated
that “European competition law has been made to apply more in
the sports sector than in other sectors,” because the ECJ now as-
sumes that sports organizations always act as undertakings, and it
does not tailor its analysis to the allegedly anticompetitive action.159
Subiotto’s conclusion is compelling: the willingness of the ECJ to
draw sports more explicitly into the domain of the TFEU, and spe-
cifically Articles 101 and 102, can only be considered a baseless ero-
sion, if not elimination, of the sporting exemption.
E. The Commission White Paper on Sport and the European
Rule of Reason Mean Sports Remain Special
Under the TFEU
After decades of interaction between the European Commis-
sion, ECJ, and the sports community, the Commission published a
White Paper on Sport in 2007, addressing the societal role sport
plays in Europe, its economic dimension, and its organization.160
The intersection of European competition law and sport is briefly
addressed, but it is more comprehensively explored in the White
Paper’s attachment Staff Working Document, Annex I.161  In this
document, though not legally binding, the Commission declares
dead immunity from competition laws for sporting organizations
and rules: “A general exemption of sporting rules or of activities of
156. Romano Subiotto, The Adoption and Enforcement of Anti-doping Rules Should
not be Subjected to European Competition Law, 31 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 323, 330
(2010) (criticizing ECJ’s decision).
157. See id. at 327 (elaborating on criticisms).
158. Id. at 328 (proposing more specific application of test).
159. See id. at 330 (examining ECJ’s decision).
160. See Commission White Paper on Sport, at 3, COM (2007) 391 final (July 11,
2007).
161. See Commission White Paper on Sport Annex I: Sport and EU Competition Rules,
at para. 2, COM (2007) 391 final (July 11, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa
.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52007SC0935&from=EN
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sports associations is neither possible nor warranted.”162  Neverthe-
less, a specific exception does remain under Meca-Medina, and the
Working Document breaks down the proper line of reasoning as
follows: First, is the sport association that adopted the rule an un-
dertaking or association of undertakings?  Note that an entity is an
undertaking “to the extent it carries out an ‘economic activity’ it-
self.”163  Second, does the rule restrict competition under Article
101(1) or is it an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102?
To answer the second question, one must consider the context in
which the rule was adopted, produces its effects, and its objectives.
Further, ask, are those restrictions inherent in the pursuit of those
objectives, and is the rule proportional in light of the objectives?
Third, is trade between member states affected?  And lastly, does
the rule fulfill the conditions of Article 101(3)?164
It is mainly in the second stage of this process where sports
organizations must now actively defend themselves under competi-
tion law.  When a sporting organization can show that it has
adopted a rule with the purpose of promoting a sporting objective,
that rule does not violate Article 101 or 102, even if its effect is
anticompetitive.  This exception was born in the Wouters case, which
did not concern sports, and, therefore, is not exclusive to sports.165
The court in Meca-Medina applied Wouters to a strictly sporting rule
and brought sports into the fold of the “European rule of reason”
as applied to Article 101.166  Furthermore, this second stage is an
exception to the very text of Article 101(1), which prohibits all
agreements whose object or effect is anticompetitive.  If an agree-
ment’s object is innocuous with respect to competition, but its ef-
fect is not, it is prohibited by Article 101, with the only exceptions
being found in 101(3).
What the ECJ established in Wouters and applied in Meca-Me-
dina—reasoning which has now been adopted in the White Pa-
per—was read into Article 101(1) as a justification for an otherwise
anticompetitive action on public policy grounds.  Despite finding in
Wouters that a regulation of The Netherlands Bar restricted compe-
tition under Article 101(1), the ECJ decided the regulation was not
unlawful under 101(1) “on the ground of a non-economic argu-
162. Id. at para. 2.1.7 (summarizing application of Articles to sport).
163. Id. at para. 3.4 (discussing antitrust).
164. See id. para. 2.1.2 (discussing application of test).
165. Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde
von Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-01577 (ruling on exception in legal profession).
166. See KATALIN JUDIT CSERES, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
268 (2005).
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ment . . . without applying Article [101(3) TFEU].”167  This deroga-
tion from the prohibition in Article 101(1), without utilizing Article
101(3), is an application of what has been called the “European
rule of reason.”168  Not surprisingly, this is an unpopular approach
to European competition law by the ECJ because it introduces a
“public interest objective into the wording of [Article 101(1)
TFEU], which ‘misconstrues the ratio legis and the structure of the
Treaty provisions.’”169  As structured, the prohibited action in Arti-
cle 101(1) can only be counterbalanced by the exceptions listed in
Article 101(3); Wouters is a court-made exception to this, and Meca-
Medina expanded the application of the European rule of reason
into the sports sector.  Therefore, far from being a sports-exclusive
exception from competition law, Meca-Medina represents the ECJ’s
confirmation of its own, judicially-created rule of reason and the
Court’s willingness to expand its application to sporting cases.
F. Europe’s “Rule of Reason” Carves Out an
Exception for Sports
The Walrave sports exemption did not appear to have a strict
legal basis, especially considering that professional sporting rules
undeniably have an impact on commercial activities in Europe.170
After the elimination of the exemption in Meca-Medina and the sub-
sequent Commission White Paper supporting that decision, sports
are now afforded special treatment based partly on their place in
European society, but primarily due to the features of the sports
industry.
In an effort to differentiate the European antitrust legal re-
gime from the US system, the term “rule of reason” has been disfa-
vored in Europe.171  The principles of that approach to antitrust
cases have still managed to seep into European jurisprudence,
Wouters being an example. Concerning the internal regulations of a
professional organization, the case determined that rules that con-
strain competition under Article 101(1) could be justified by the
overall context from which the rules arose, the rule’s objectives,
167. Id. at 269 (discussing ECJ’s decision).
168. Id. at 268 (elaborating on differentiation). .
169. Id. at 270 (quoting Opinion of Advocate General Le´ger in Wouters, 2002
E.C.R. I-1577, para. 107 (July 10, 2001)).
170. See generally AG Lenz, supra note 124 (discussing transfer rules). R
171. Mel Marquis, O2 (Germany) v Commission and the Exotic Mysteries of Article
81(1) EC, 32 EURO. L. REV. 29, 45-46 (2007) (noting persistence of term “rule of
reason”).
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and the proportionality of the rules to their objectives.172  The simi-
larities to the US rule of reason are plain: faced with the relatively
broad language of Article 101, the ECJ has found it necessary to
allow the party whose actions are anticompetitive to justify those
decisions based on special circumstances.  The availability of this
affirmative defense to Article 101(1) applies nicely to a sports indus-
try that has long sought to be free of European regulation.  In Meca-
Medina, the Court initially appeared to encroach on sports organi-
zation sovereignty in ruling that the entire TFEU applies, but then
opens the escape hatch of Wouters, and makes all of the anticompe-
titive regulations justifiable.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Sports organizations act primarily with the intent of perpetuat-
ing their own existence, not necessarily in order to eliminate eco-
nomic competition between teams or competitors, which tends to
be an essential problem regarding both the US and EU antitrust
law regulation.  For them to exist, outcomes of matches and games
must be unpredictable, so competition between teams or athletes
must be as balanced as possible.  Maintaining competitive balance
between clubs and competitors is at the heart of the tension in the
business of sports.  Sports are built on competition, but economic
competition must be restricted when it affects sporting contests.
Automatic rule of reason scrutiny for sports antitrust cases in
the US means leagues are always afforded the opportunity to justify
their anticompetitive actions based on the nature of their industry.
Virtually nothing the leagues do can be considered per se anticom-
petitive.  Because US professional sports leagues are strictly com-
mercial endeavors with no higher societal role as in the EU,
subjecting them to the antitrust laws is perfectly logical, and the
necessarily unusual structure of the leagues justifies their rule of
reason treatment.
By contrast, the current state of European competition law and
professional sports is not as well-founded. Article 101 TFEU is
worded more specifically than the Sherman Act, and the entirety of
its exceptions are described in subsection 101(3).  The European
rule of reason, as it considers only the object of a rule and not its
effect, and disregards Article 101(3) altogether, might turn out to
be a doctrine just as baseless as the Walrave exemption for purely
sporting rules.  If so, it will also fall apart.  Until then, this judicially
172. Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577, para. 97 (observing case-by-case nature of
issue).
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invented analysis could create unnecessary uncertainty for sporting
organizations in Europe.  Therefore, sports organizations must ad-
vocate for a more certain status under European law.
Finding the right balance between allowing sports organiza-
tions to govern themselves and their participants and interfering in
their operations so they do not abuse their monopoly powers has
been a constant struggle in the EU and US over decades.  Both ju-
risdictions explicitly exempted sports from the reach of their anti-
trust laws in early cases.  In both jurisdictions, the explicit sporting
exemption is almost entirely a thing of the past, but professional
sports organizations continue to receive special consideration when
they face an antitrust challenge.  And so the tension between com-
petition and collusion in professional sports continues.
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